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Abstract
We propose a simple global computing framework, whose main concern is code migration. Systems
are structured in sites, and each site is divided into two parts: a computing body, and a membrane
which regulates the interactions between the computing body and the external environment. More
precisely, membranes are ﬁlters which control access to the associated site, and they also rely on
the well-established notion of trust between sites. We develop a basic theory to express and enforce
security policies via membranes. Initially, these only control the actions incoming agents intend to
perform locally. We then adapt the basic theory to encompass more sophisticated policies, where
the number of actions an agent wants to perform, and also their order, are considered.
Keywords: Global Computing, Code Migration, Access Control, Security Policies, Types.
1 This work has been partially supported by EU FET – Global Computing initiative,
projects MIKADO IST-2001-32222 and MyThS IST-2001-32617. The funding bodies are
not responsible for any use that might be made of the results presented here.
2 Email: gorla@di.uniroma1.it
3 Email: matthewh@susx.ac.uk
4 Email: vs@susx.ac.uk
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 138 (2005) 23–42
1571-0661 © 2005 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
www.elsevier.com/locate/entcs
doi:10.1016/j.entcs.2005.05.003
1 Introduction
Computing is increasingly characterised by the global scale of applications and
the ubiquity of interactions between mobile components. Among the main
features of the forthcoming “global ubiquitous computing” paradigm we list
distribution and location awarness, whereby code located at speciﬁc sites acts
appropriately to local parameters and circumstances, that is, it is “context-
aware”; mobility, whereby code is dispatched from site to site to increase
ﬂexibility and expressivity; openness, reﬂecting the nature of global networks
and embodying the permeating hypothesis of localised, partial knowledge of
the execution environment. Such systems present enormous diﬃculties, both
technical and conceptual, and are currently more at the stage of exciting future
prospectives than that of established of engineering practice. Two concerns,
however, appear to clearly have a ever-reaching import: security and mobility
control, arising respectively from openness and from massive code and resource
migrations. They are the focus of the present paper.
We aim at classifying mobile components according to their behaviour,
and at empowering sites with control capabilities which allow them to deny
access to those agents whose behaviour does not conform to the site’s policy.
We see every site of a system
k[[ M |〉 P ]]
as an entity named k and structured in two layers: a computing body P , where
programs run their code – possibly accessing local resources oﬀered by the site
– and a membrane M , which regulates the interactions between the computing
body and the external environment. An agent P wishing to enter a site N
must be veriﬁed by the membrane before it is given a chance to execute in N .
If the preliminary check succeeds, the agent is allowed to execute, otherwise
it is rejected. In other words, a membrane implements the policy each site
wants to enforce locally, by ruling on the requests of access of the incoming
agents. This can be easily expressed by a migration rule of the form:
k[[Mk |〉go l.P | Q ]] ‖ l[[M l |〉R ]] → k[[Mk |〉Q ]] ‖ l[[M l |〉P | R ]] if M l k P
The relevant parts here are P , the agent wishing to migrate from k to l, and
l, the receiving site, which needs to be satisﬁed that P ’s behaviour complies
with its policy. The latter is expressed by l’s membrane, M l. The judgement
M l k P represents l inspecting the incoming code to verify that it upholds
M l.
D. Gorla et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 138 (2005) 23–4224
Observe that in the formulation above M l k P represent a runtime check
of all incoming agents. Because of our fundamental assumption of openended-
ness, such kind of checks, undesirable as they, cannot be avoided. In order to
reduce their impact on systems performance, and to make the runtime seman-
tics as eﬃcient as possible, we adopt a strategy which allows for eﬃcient agent
veriﬁcation. Precisely, we adopt an elementary notion of trust, so that from
the point of view of each l the set of sites is consistently partitioned between
“good,” “bad,” and “unknown” sites. Then, in a situation like the one in the
rule above, we assume that l will be willing to accept from a trusted site k a
k-certiﬁed digest T of P ’s behaviour. We then modify the primitive go and
the judgement k as in the reﬁned migration rule below.
k[[Mk |〉goTl.P | Q ]] ‖ l[[M
l |〉R ]] → k[[Mk |〉Q ]] ‖ l[[M l |〉P |R ]] if M l kT P
The notable diﬀerence is in M l kT P . Here, l veriﬁes the entire code P against
M l only if it does not trust k, the signer of P ’s certiﬁcate T. Otherwise, it
suﬃces for l to match M l against the digest T carried by go together with P
from k, so eﬀectively shifting work from l to the originator of P .
Our main concern in this paper is to put the focus on the machinery a
membrane should implement to enforce diﬀerent kinds of policies. We ﬁrst
distill the simplest calculus which can conceivably convey our ideas and still
support a non-trivial study. It is important to remark that we are abstracting
from agents’ local computations. These can be expressed in any of several well-
known models for concurrency, for example CCS [13] or the π–calculus [14].
We are concerned, instead, with agents’ migration from site to site: our main
language mechanism is go rather than intra-site (i.e. local) communication.
Using this language, we examine four notions of policy and show how they can
be enforced by using membranes. We start with an amusingly simple policy
which only lists allowed actions. We then move to count action occurrences
and then to policies expressed by deterministic ﬁnite automata. Note that
such policies are only concerned with the behaviour of single agents, and do
not take into account “coalitional” behaviours, whereby incoming agents –
apparently innocent – join clusters of resident agents – they too apparently
innocent – to perform cooperatively potentially harmful actions, or at least
overrule the host site’s policy. We call resident those policies intended to be
applied to the joint, composite behaviour of the agents contained at a site.
We explore resident policies as our fourth and ﬁnal notion of policy. In all the
cases, the theory adapts smoothly to the various cases; we only need to reﬁne
the information stored in the membrane and the inspection mechanisms.
Structure of the paper. In Section 2 we deﬁne the calculus used in this
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Agents P,Q,R ::= nil
∣∣∣ a.P ∣∣∣ goTl.P
∣∣∣ P |Q ∣∣∣ !P
Systems N ::= 0
∣∣∣ l[[ M |〉 P ]] ∣∣∣ N1 ‖ N2
Fig. 1. A Simple Calculus
paper, and start with the straightforward policy which only prescribes the
actions an agent can perform when running in a site. In Section 3, we enhance
the theory to control also how many (and not only which kind of) actions
an agent wants to perform in a site, and their order of execution. Finally, in
Section 4 we extend the theory to control the overall computation taking place
at a site, and not only the behaviour of single agents. The paper concludes in
Section 5 where a comparison with related work is also given. The theoretical
results are proved in the full paper [8].
2 A Simple Calculus
In this section we describe a simple calculus for mobile agents, which may
migrate between sites. Each site is guarded by a membrane, whose task is to
ensure that every agent accepted at the site conforms to an entry policy.
2.1 The Syntax
The syntax is given in Figure 1 and assumes two pairwise disjoint sets: basic
agent actions Act, ranged over by a, b, c, · · · , and localities Loc, ranged over
by l, k, h, · · · . Agents are constructed using the standard action-preﬁxing,
parallel composition and replication operators from process calculi, [13]. The
one novel operator is that for migration, goTl.P . This agent seeks to migrate
to site l in order to execute the code P ; moreover it promises to conform to
the entry policy T. In practical terms this might consist of a certiﬁcation that
the incoming code P conforms to the policy T, which the site l has to decide
whether or not to accept. In our framework, this certiﬁcation is a policy that
describes the (local) behaviour of the agent; thus, in goTl.P , T will be called
the digest of P .
A system consists of a ﬁnite set of sites running in parallel. A site takes the
form l[[M |〉P ]], where l is the site name, P is the code currently running at l,
and M is the membrane which implements the entry policy. For convenience
we assume that site names are unique in systems. Thus, in a given system we
can identify the membrane associated with the site named l by M l. We start
with a very simple kind of policy, which we will then progressively enhance.
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Deﬁnition 2.1 [Policies] A policy is any ﬁnite subset of Act∪Loc. For two
policies T1 and T2, we write T1 enforces T2 whenever T1 ⊆ T2.
Intuitively an agent conforms to a policy T at a given site if every action it
performs at the site is contained in T, and it will only migrate to sites whose
names are in T. For example, conforming to the policy {info, req, home},
where info, req are actions and home a location, means that the only actions
that will be performed are from the set {info, req} and migration will only
occur, if at all, to the site home. With this interpretation of policies, our
deﬁnition of the predicate enforces is also intuitive; if some code P conforms
to the policy T1 and T1 enforces T2 then P also automatically conforms to
T2.
The purpose of membranes is to enforce such policies on incoming agents.
In other words, at a site l[[M |〉Q]] wishing to enforce a policy Tin, the membrane
M has to decide when to allow entry to an agent such as goTl.P from another
site. There are two possibilities.
• The ﬁrst is to syntactically check the code P against the policy Tin; an
implementation would actually expect the agent to arrive with a proof of
this fact, and this proof would be checked.
• The second would be to trust the agent that its code P conforms to the
stated T and therefore only check that this conforms to the entry policy
Tin. Assuming that checking one policy against another is more eﬃcient
than the code analysis, this would make entry formalities much easier.
Deciding on when to apply the second possibility presupposes a trust man-
agement framework for systems, which is the topic of much current research.
To simplify matters, here we simply assume that each site contains, as part
of its membrane, a record of the level of trust it has in other sites. Moreover,
we assume only three possible levels: lbad, loc and lgood.
Deﬁnition 2.2 [Membranes] A membrane M is a pair (Mt,Mp) where Mt is
a partial function from Loc to {loc, lgood, lbad}, and Mp is a policy.
2.2 The Operational Semantics
Having deﬁned both policies and membranes, we now give an operational
semantics for the calculus, which formalises the above discussion of how to
manage agent migration. This is given as a binary relation N → N ′ over sys-
tems; it is deﬁned to be the least relation which satisﬁes the rules in Figure 2.
Rule (r-act) says that the agent a.P running in parallel with other code
in site l, such as Q, can perform the action a; note that the semantics does
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(r-act) l[[ M |〉 a.P | Q ]] → l[[ M |〉 P |Q ]]
(r-par)
N1 → N
′
1
N1 ‖ N2 → N
′
1 ‖ N2
(r-struct)
N ≡ N1 N1 → N
′
1 N
′
1 ≡ N
′
N → N ′
(r-mig) k[[ Mk |〉 goTl.P | Q ]] ‖ l[[ M
l |〉R ]] →
k[[ Mk |〉Q ]] ‖ l[[ M l |〉 P |R ]] if M l kT P
Fig. 2. The reduction relation
not record the occurrence of a. (r-par) and (r-struct) are standard. The
ﬁrst allows reductions within parallel components, while the second says that
reductions are relative to a structural equivalence. The precise rules deﬁn-
ing this equivalence are unsurprising and therefore left to the full paper [8];
they state that ‘|’ and ‘‖’ are monoidal operators (with nil and 0 acting as
identities, resp.), and that replicated processes can be freely unfolded. The
interesting reduction rule is the last one, (r-mig), governing migration; the
agent goTl.P can migrate from site k to site l provided the predicate M
l kT P
is true. This ‘enabling’ predicate formalises our discussion above on the role
of the membrane M l, and requires in turn a notion of code P satisfying a
policy T,
 P : T
With such a notion, we can then deﬁne M l kT P to be:
if M lt (k) = lgood then (T enforces Mp
l ) else  P : Mp
l (1)
In other words, if the target site l trusts the source site k, it trusts that the
professed policy T is a faithful reﬂection of the behaviour of the incoming
agent P , and then entry is gained provided that T enforces the entry policy
Mp
l (i.e., in this case, T ⊆ Mp
l ). Otherwise, if k can not be trusted, then the
entire incoming code P has to be checked to ensure that it conforms to the
entry policy, as expressed by the predicate  P : Mp
l .
In Figure 3 we describe a simple inference system for checking that
agents conform to policies, i.e. to infer judgements of the form  P : T.
Rule (tc-empty) simply says that the empty agent nil satisﬁes all policies.
(tc-act) is also straightforward; a.P satisﬁes a policy T and if a is allowed
by T, and the residual P satisﬁes T. The rule (tc-par) says that to check
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(tc-empty)
 nil : T
(tc-act)
 P : T
 a.P : T
a ∈ T
(tc-mig)
 P : T′
 goT′l.P : T
l ∈ T
(tc-repl)
 P : T
 !P : T
(tc-par)
 P : T  Q : T
 P | Q : T
Fig. 3. Typechecking incoming agents
P | Q it is suﬃcient to check P and Q separately, and similarly for replicated
agents. The most interesting rule is (tc-mig), which checks goT′ l.P . This not
only checks that migration to l is allowed by the policy, that is l ∈ T, but it
also checks that the code to be spawned there, P , conforms to the associated
professed policy T′. In some sense, if the agent goT′ l.P is allowed a entry into
a site k, then k assumes responsibility for any promises that it makes about
conformance to policies.
2.3 Safety
We have just outlined a reduction semantics in which sites seek to enforce
policies either by directly checking the code of incoming agents against entry
policies, or more simply by checking the professed policy of trusted agents.
The extent to which this strategy works depends, not surprisingly, on the
quality of a site’s trust management.
Example 2.3 Let home be a site name with the following trust function
Mht : {alice,bob, secure} 
→ lgood .
Consider the system
S

= home[[Mh |〉P h]] ‖ bob[[M b |〉P b]] ‖ alice[[Ma |〉P a]] ‖ secure[[Ms |〉P s]]
in which the entry policy of home, Mp
h, is {info, req, secure}, and that of
secure, Mp
s, is {give, home}. Since Mht (bob) = lgood, agents migrating
from bob to home are trusted and only their digests are checked against the
entry policy Mp
h. So, if P b contains the agent
goT1home.(take.Q)
where T1 enforces Mp
h, then the entry policy of home will be transgressed.
The problem in this example is that the trust knowledge of home is faulty;
it trusts in sites which do not properly ensure that professed policies are en-
forced. Let us divide the sites into trustworthy and otherwise. This biparti-
tion could be stored in an external record stating which nodes are trustworthy
D. Gorla et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 138 (2005) 23–42 29
(wf-empty)
 0 : ok
(wf-g.site)
 P : Mp
 l[[ M |〉 P ]] : ok
l trustworthy
(wf-par)
 N1 : ok,  N2 : ok
 N1 ‖ N2 : ok
(wf-u.site)
 l[[ M |〉 P ]] : ok
l not trustworthy
Fig. 4. Well-formed systems
(i.e. typechecked) and which ones are not. However, for economy, we prefer
to record this information in the membranes, by demanding that the trust
knowledge at trustworthy sites is a proper reﬂection of this division. This is
more easily deﬁned if we assume the following ordering over trust levels:
loc <: lbad and loc <: lgood
This reﬂects the intuitive idea that sites classiﬁed as loc may, perhaps with
further information, be subsequently classiﬁed either as lgood or lbad. On
the other hand, lgood or lbad cannot be further reﬁned; sites classiﬁed as
either, will not be reclassiﬁed.
Deﬁnition 2.4 [Trustworthy sites and Coherent systems] In a system N , we
say the site k is trustworthy if Mkt (k) = lgood. N is coherent if for every
trustworthy site k, it holds that Mkt (l) <: M
l
t (l).
Thus, if a trustworthy site k believes that a site l can be trusted (i.e.,
Mkt (l) = lgood), then l is indeed trustworthy (as represented by M
l
t(l) =
lgood). Similarly, if it believes l to be lbad, then l is indeed bad. The only
uncertainty is when k classiﬁes l as loc: then l may be either lgood or lbad.
Of course, in coherent systems we expect sites which have been classiﬁed as
trustworthy to act in a trustworthy manner, which amounts to say that code
running at such a k must have at one time gained entry there by satisfying
the entry policy. Note that by using policies as in Deﬁnition 2.1, if P satisﬁes
an entry policy Mp
k, then it continues to satisfy the policy while running at k
(cf. Theorem 2.7 below).
This property of coherent systems, which we call well-formedness, can
therefore be checked syntactically. In Figure 4, we give the set of rules for
deriving the judgement  N : ok, of well-formedness of N . There are only
two interesting rules. Firstly, (wf-g.site) says that l[[ M |〉 P ]] is well-formed
whenever l is trustworthy and  P : Mp. There is a subtlety here; this not only
means that P conforms to the policy Mp, but also that any digests proﬀered
by agents in P can also be trusted. The second relevant rule is (wf-u.site),
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(lts-act)
a.P
a
→ P
(lts-mig)
goTl.P
l
→ nil
(lts-repl)
P | !P
α
→ P ′
!P
α
→ P ′
(lts-par)
P1
α
→ P ′1
P1 | P2
α
→ P ′1 | P2
P2 | P1
α
→ P2 | P
′
1
Fig. 5. A Labelled Transition System
for typing unknown sites: here there is no need to check the resident code, as
agents emigrating from such sites will not be trusted.
Example 2.5 (Example 2.3 continued.) Let us now re-examine the system S
in Example 2.3. Suppose home is trustworthy, that is Mht (home) = lgood.
Then, if S is to be coherent, it is necessary for each of the sites bob, alice
and secure also to be trustworthy. Consequently, S can not be well-formed.
For example, to derive  S : ok it would be necessary to derive
 goT1home.(take.Q) : Mp
b
where Mp
b is the entry policy of bob. But this requires the judgement 
take.Q : T1, where T1 enforces Mp
h. Since take ∈ Mp
h, this is not possible.
In well-formed systems we know that entry policies have been respected.
So one way of demonstrating that our reduction strategy correctly enforces
these policies is to prove two things: system well-formedness is preserved by
reduction, and only legal computations take place within trustworthy sites.
The ﬁrst requirement is straightforward to formalize:
Theorem 2.6 (Subject Reduction) If  N : ok and N → N ′, then  N ′ :
ok.
To formalise the second requirement we need some notion of the compu-
tations of an agent. With this in mind, we ﬁrst deﬁne a labelled transition
system between agents, which details the immediate actions an agent can per-
form, and the residual of those actions. The rules for the judgements P
α
→ Q,
where we let α to range over Act ∪ Loc, are given in Figure 5, and are all
straightforward. These judgements are then extended to P
σ
→ Q, where σ
ranges over (Act ∪ Loc)∗, in the standard manner: σ = α1, . . . , αk, when
there exists P0, . . . , Pk such that P = P0
α1→ . . .
αk→ Pk = P
′. Finally, let
act(σ) denote the set of all elements of Act ∪ Loc in σ.
Theorem 2.7 (Safety) Let N be a well-formed system. Then, for every
trustworthy site l[[ M |〉 P ]] in N , P
σ
→ P ′ implies that act(σ) enforces Mp.
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3 Entry Policies
The calculus of the previous section is based on a simple notion of entry
policies, namely ﬁnite sets of actions and location names. An agent conforms
to such a policy T at a site if it only executes actions in T before migrating to
some location in T. However both the syntax and the semantics of the calculus
are completely parametric on policies. All that is required of the collection
of policies is a binary relation T1 enforces T2 between them, and a binary
relation  P : T indicating that the code P conforms to the policy T. With
any collection of policies, endowed with two such relations, we can deﬁne the
predicate M kT P as in (1) above, and thereby get a reduction semantics for
the calculus. In this section we investigate two variations on the notion of
entry policies and discuss the extent to which we can prove that the reduction
strategy correctly implements them.
3.1 Multisets as Entry Policies
The policies of the previous section only express the legal actions agents may
perform at a site. However in many situations more restrictive policies are
desirable. To clarify this point, consider the following example.
Example 3.1 Let mail serv be the site name of a mail server with the fol-
lowing entry policy Mp
ms: {list, send, retr, del, reset, quit}. The server
accepts client agents performing requests for listing mail messages, send-
ing/retrieving/deleting messages, resetting the mailbox and quitting. Now,
consider the system
S

= mail serv[[ Mms |〉 Pms ]] ‖ spam[[ Ms |〉 goTmail serv.(!send) ]]
where T = {send}. According to the typechecking of Figure 3, we have that
 ! send : Mp
ms. However, the agent is a spamming virus and, in practical
implementations, should be rejected by mail serv.
In such scenarios it would be more suitable for policies to be able to ﬁx an
upper-bound over the number of messages sent. This can be achieved in our
setting by changing policies from sets of agent actions to multisets of actions.
First let us ﬁx some notation. We can view a multiset as a set equipped
with an occurrence function, that associates a natural number to each element
of the set. To model permanent resources, we also allow the occurrence func-
tion to associate ω to an element with an inﬁnite number of occurrences in the
multiset. Notationally, eω stands for an element e occurring inﬁnitely many
times in a multiset. This notation is extended to sets; for any set E, we let
Eω to denote the multiset {eω : e ∈ E}.
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(tc-empty)
 nil : T
(tc-act)
 P : T
 a.P : T ∪ {a}
(tc-mig)
 P : T′
 goT′ l.P : T ∪ {l}
(tc-par)
 P : T1  Q : T2
 P | Q : T1 ∪ T2
(tc-repl)
 P : T
 !P : T′
Tω enforces T′
Fig. 6. Typechecking with policies as Multisets
Example 3.2 (Example 3.1 continued.) Coming back to Example 3.1, it
would be suﬃcient to deﬁne Mp
ms to be {. . . , sendK , . . .} where K is a rea-
sonable constant. In this way, an agent can only send at most K messages
in each session; if it wants to send more messages, it has to disconnect from
mail serv (i.e. leave it) and then reconnect again (i.e. immigrate again later
on).
The theory presented in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 can be adapted to the case
where policies are multisets of actions. The judgment  P : T is redeﬁned
in Figure 6, where operator ∪ stands for multiset union. The key rules are
(tc-act), (tc-par) and (tc-repl). The ﬁrst two properly decrease the type
satisﬁed when typechecking sub-agents. The third one is needed because re-
cursive agents can be, in general, freely unfolded; hence, the actions they in-
tend to locally perform can be iterated arbitrarily many times. For instance,
agent P

= ! send, satisﬁes policy T

= {sendω}. Notice that the new pol-
icy satisfaction judgement prevents the spamming virus of Example 3.1 from
typechecking against the policy of mail serv deﬁned in Example 3.2.
The analysis of the previous section can also be repeated here but an
appropriate notion of well-formed system is more diﬃcult to formulate. The
basic problem stems from the diﬀerence between entry policies and resident
policies. The fact that all agents who have ever entered a site l respects an
entry policy Mp gives no guarantees as to whether the joint eﬀect with the
code currently occupying the site l also satisﬁes Mp. For instance, in the terms
of Example 3.2, mail serv ensures that each incoming agent can only send
at most K messages. Nevertheless, two such agents, having gained entry and
now running concurrently at mail serv, can legally send – jointly – up to
2K messages. It is therefore necessary to formulate well-formedness in terms
of the individual threads of the code currently executing at a site. Let us
say P is a thread if it is not of the form P1 |P2. Note that every agent P
can be written in the form of P1| . . . |Pn, n ≥ 1, where each Pi is a thread.
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So the well-formedness judgment is modiﬁed by replacing rule (wf-g.site) in
Figure 4 as below.
(wf-g.sitem)
∀i . (Pi a thread and  Pi : Mp)
 l[[ M |〉 P1| . . . |Pn ]] : ok
l trustworthy
Theorem 3.3 (Subject Reduction for multiset policies) If  N : ok
and N → N ′, then  N ′ : ok.
The statement of safety must be changed to reﬂect the focus on individual
threads rather than agents.
Theorem 3.4 (Safety for multiset policies) Let N be a well-formed sys-
tem. Then, for every trustworthy site l[[ M |〉 P1| . . . |Pn ]] in N , where each Pi
is a thread, Pi
σ
→ P ′i implies that act(σ) enforces Mp.
3.2 Finite Automata as Entry Policies
A second limitation of the setting presented in Section 2 is that policies will
sometimes need to prescribe a precise order for executing legal actions. This
is very common in client/server interactions, where a precise protocol (i.e.
a pattern of message exchange) must be respected. To this aim, we deﬁne
policies as deterministic ﬁnite automata (DFAs, for short).
Example 3.5 Let us consider Example 3.1 again. Usually, mail servers re-
quires a preliminary authentication phase to give access to mail services. To
express this fact, we could implement the entry policy of mail serv, Mp
ms, to
be the automaton associated to the regular expression below.
usr.pwd.(list+ send+ retr+ del+ reset)∗.quit
The server accepts client requests only upon authentication, via a user-
name/password mechanism. Moreover, the policy imposes that each session is
regularly committed by imposing that each sequence of actions is terminated
by quit. This could be required to save the status of the transaction and
avoid inconsistencies.
We now give the formal deﬁnitions needed to adapt the theory developed
in Section 2. We start by deﬁning a DFA, the language associated to it, the
enforces predicate between DFAs and a way for an agent to satisfy a DFA.
As usual [11], a DFA is a quintuple A

= (S,Σ, s0, F, δ) where S is a ﬁnite set
of states, Σ is the input alphabeth, s0 ∈ S is the starting state, ∅ ⊂ F ⊆ S
is the set of ﬁnal states, and δ : S × Σ → S is the transition relation In
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our framework, the alphabeth of the DFAs considered is a ﬁnite subset of
Act∪Loc. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, we shall always assume that
the DFAs in this paper are minimal.
Deﬁnition 3.6 [DFA Acceptance and Enforcement] Let A be a DFA. Then
• Acps(A) contains all the σ ∈ Σ
∗ such that σ leads A from state s to a ﬁnal
state;
• Acp(A) is deﬁned to be Acps0(A);
• A1 enforces A2 holds true whenever Acp(A1) ⊆ Acp(A2).
We now formally describe the language associated to an agent. To this aim,
we exploit the notion of concurrent regular expressions (CRE, for short) in-
troduced in [7] to model concurrent processes. For our purposes, the following
subset of CRE suﬃces:
e ::=  | α | e1.e2 | e1  e2 | e
⊗
 denotes the empty sequence of characters, α ranges over Act ∪ Loc, ‘.’
denotes concatenation,  is the interleaving (or shuﬄe) operator and ⊗ is
its closure. Intuitively, if e represents the language L, then e⊗ represents
{} ∪ L ∪ L  L ∪ L  L  L . . .. Given a CRE e, the language associated
to it, written lang(e), can be easily deﬁned; a formal deﬁnition is given in the
full paper. Now, given a process P , we easily deﬁne a CRE associated to it.
Formally
CRE(nil)

=  CRE(a.P )

= a.CRE(P )
CRE(goAl.P )

= l CRE(P1 |P2)

= CRE(P1) CRE(P2)
CRE(!P )

= CRE(P )⊗
Deﬁnition 3.7 [DFA Satisfaction] An agent P satisﬁes the DFA A, written
 P : A, if lang(CRE(P )) ⊆ Acp(A) and, for every subagent of P of the form
goA′ l.Q, it holds that  Q : A
′.
In the full paper, we prove that the enforcement predicate can be estab-
lished eﬃciently, while DFA satisfaction is decidable, but extremely hard to
establish. This substantiate our hypothesis that verifying digests is preferable
to inspecting the full code from the point of view computational complexity.
We are now ready to state the soundness of this variation. It simply consists
in ﬁnding a proper notion of well-formed systems. Like in Section 3.1, the
entry policy can only express properties of single threads, instead of coalitions
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of threads hosted at a site. Thus, we modiﬁy rule (wf-g.site) from Figure 4
as below.
(wf-g.siteA)
∀i . Pi a thread and ∃s ∈ S . lang(CRE(Pi)) ⊆ Acps(Mp)
 l[[ M |〉 P1| . . . |Pn ]] : ok
l trustworthy
This essentially requires that the languages associated to each of the threads in
l are suﬃxes of words accepted by Mp (cf. Theorem 3.9 below). Since this may
appear quite weak, it is worth remarking that the well-formedness predicate
is just a ‘consistency’ check, a way to express that the agent is in a state from
where it will respect the policy of l.
Theorem 3.8 (Subject Reduction for automata policies) If  N : ok
and N → N ′, then  N ′ : ok.
Theorem 3.9 (Safety for automata policies) Let N be a well-formed
system. Then, for every trustworthy site l[[ M |〉 P1| . . . |Pn ]] in N , where
each Pi is a thread, it holds that σ ∈ lang(CRE(Pi)) implies that there ex-
ists σ′ ∈ Acp(Mp) such that σ
′ = σ′′σ, for some σ′′.
4 Resident Policies
Here we change the intended interpretation of policies. In the previous section
a policy dictated the proposed behaviour of an agent prior to execution in a
site, at the point of entry. This implied that safety in well-formed systems
was a thread-wise property (see rules (wf-g.siteM) and (wf-g.siteA)). Here
we focus on policies which are intended to describe the permitted (coalitional)
behaviour of agents during execution at a site. Nevertheless these resident
policies are still used to determine whether a new agent is allowed access
to the site in question; entry will only be permitted if the addition of this
incoming agent to the code currently executing at the site does not violate
the policy.
Let us consider an example to illustrate the diﬀerence between entry and
resident policies.
Example 4.1 Let licence serv be the site name of a server that makes
available K licences to download and install a software product. The distri-
bution policy is based on a queue: the ﬁrst K agents landing in the site are
granted the licence, the following ones are denied. The policy of the server
should be Mp
s = {get licenceK}. However if this policy is interpreted as an
entry policy, applying the theory of Section 3.1, then the system grants at
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most K licences to each incoming agent. Moreover this situation continues
indeﬁnitely, eﬀectively handing out licences to all incoming agents.
We wish to re-interpret the policies of the previous section as resident
policies and here we outline two diﬀerent schemes for enforcing such policies.
For simplicity we conﬁne our attention to one kind of policy, that of multisets.
4.1 Static membranes
Our ﬁrst scheme is conservative in the sense that many of the concepts devel-
oped in Section 3.1 for entry policies can be redeployed. Let us reconsider the
migration rule from Figure 2:
(r-mig) k[[ Mk |〉 goTl.P | Q ]] ‖ l[[ M
l |〉R ]] →
k[[ Mk |〉Q ]] ‖ l[[ M l |〉 P |R ]] if M l kT P
(2)
Here the membrane M l only takes into consideration the incoming code P ,
and its digest T, when deciding on entry, via the predicate M l kT P . But
if the membrane is to enforce a resident policy, then it must also take into
account the contribution of the code already running in l, R. To do so we
need a mechanism for joining policies, such as those of the incoming P and
the resident R in (2). So let us assume that the set of policies, with the
relation enforces is a partial order in which every pair of elements T1 and
T2 has a least upper bound, denoted T1 unionsq T2. For multiset policies this is
the case as unionsq is simply multiset union. In addition we need to be able to
calculate the (minimal) policy which a process R satisﬁes; let us denote this
as pol(R). For multiset policies we can adjust the rules in Figure 6, essentially
by eliminating weakening, to perform this calculation; the resulting rules are
given in Figure 7, with judgements of the form  P : T.
Deﬁnition 4.2 Deﬁne the partial function pol(·) over closed terms by letting
pol(P ) to be the unique policy such that  P : T, if it exists.
With these extra concepts we can now change the rule (r-mig) in (2) to
take the current resident code into account. It is suﬃcient to change the side
condition, from M l kT P to M
l, R kT P , where this latter is deﬁned to be
if M lt (k) = lgood then (Tunionsq pol(R)) enforces Mp
l else  P | R : Mp
l
Here if only the digest needs to be checked then we compare Tunionsq pol(R), that
is the result of adding the digest to the policy of the resident code R, against
the resident policy Mp. On the other hand if the source site is untrusted we
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(ti-empty)
 nil : ∅
(ti-act)
 P : T
 a.P : T ∪ {a}
(ti-mig)
 P : T′
 goTl.P : {l}
T′ enforces T
(ti-repl)
 P : T
 !P : Tω
(ti-par)
 P : T1  Q : T2
 P | Q : T1 ∪ T2
Fig. 7. Type inference for agents with policies as multisets
then need to analyse the incoming code in parallel with the resident code R.
It should be clear that the theory developed in Section 3.1 is readily adapted
to this revised reduction semantics. In particular the Subject Reduction and
Safety theorems remain true; we spare the reader the details. However it
should also be clear that this approach to enforcing resident policies has serious
practical drawbacks. An implementation would need to:
(i) freeze and retrieve the current content of the site, namely the agent R;
(ii) calculate the minimal policy satisﬁed by R to be merged with P ’s digest
in order to check the predicate enforces , or typecheck the composed
agent P |R;
(iii) reactivate R and, according to the result of the checking phase, activate
P .
Even if the language were equipped with a passiﬁcation operator, as in [17], the
overall operation would still be computationally very intensive. Consequently
we suggest below another approach.
4.2 Dynamic membranes
In the previous approach we have to repeatedly calculate the policy of the
current resident code each time a new agent requests entry. Here we allow
the policy in the membrane to “decrease,” in order to reﬂect the resources
already allocated to the resident code. So at any particular moment in time
the policy currently in the membrane records what resources remain, for any
future agents who may wish to enter; with the entry of each agent there is a
corresponding decrease in the membrane’s policy. Formally we need to change
the migration rule (2) to one which not only checks incoming code, or digest,
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(wf-g.site)
Θ  l[[ M |〉 P ]] : ok
l trustworthy
(pol(P ) unionsqMp) enforces Θ(l)
(wf-empty)
Θ  0 : ok
(wf-u.site)
Θ  l[[ M |〉 P ]] : ok
l not trustworthy
(wf-par)
Θ  N1 : ok, Θ  N2 : ok
Θ  N1 ‖ N2 : ok
Fig. 8. Well-formed systems under Θ
against the membrane’s policy, but also updates the membrane:
(r-mig′) k[[ Mk |〉 goTl.P | Q ]] ‖ l[[ M
l |〉R ]] →
k[[ Mk |〉Q ]] ‖ l[[ M̂ l |〉 P |R ]] if M l kT P  M̂
l
where the judgement M l kT P  M̂
l is deﬁned as
let T′ =
⎧⎨
⎩
T if M lt (k) = lgood
pol(P ) otherwise
in (T′ enforces Mp
l ∧
Mp
l = M̂ lp unionsq T
′ ∧ M lt = M̂
l
t)
First notice that if this migration occurs then the membrane at the target site
changes, from Mp
l to M̂ lp. The latter is obtained from the former by eliminating
those resources allocated to the incoming code P . If the source site, k, is
deemed to be lgood this is calculated via the incoming digest T; otherwise a
direct analysis of the code P is required, to calculate pol(P ).
This revised schema is more reasonable from an implementation point of
view, but its soundness is more diﬃcult to formalise and prove. As a com-
putation proceeds no permanent record is kept in the system of the original
resident policies at the individual sites. Therefore well-formedness can only
be deﬁned relative to an external record of what the resident policies were,
when the system was initiated. For this purpose we use a function Θ, mapping
trustworthy sites to policies; it is suﬃcient to record the original polices at
these sites as we are not interested in the behaviour elsewhere.
Then we can deﬁne the notion of well-formed systems, relative to such a
Θ; this is written as Θ  N : ok and the formal deﬁnition is given in Table 8.
The crucial rule is (wf-g.site), for trustworthy sites. If l is such a site then
l[[ M |〉 P ]] is well-formed relative to the original record Θ if Mp
l unionsq pol(P )
guarantees the original resident policy at l, namely Θ(l).
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Theorem 4.3 (Subject Reduction for resident policies) If Θ  N : ok
and N → N ′, then Θ  N ′ : ok.
Theorem 4.4 (Safety for resident policies) Let N be a well-formed sys-
tem w.r.t. Θ. Then, for every trustworthy site l[[ M |〉 P ]] in N , P
σ
→ P ′
implies that act(σ) enforces Θ(l).
5 Conclusion and Related Work
We have presented a framework to describe distributed computations of sys-
tems involving migrating agents. The activity of agents entering/running in
‘good’ sites is constrained by a membrane that implements the layer dedicated
to the security of the site. We have described how membranes can enforce sev-
eral interesting kind of policies. The basic theory presented for the simpler
case has been reﬁned and tuned throughout the paper to increase the expres-
siveness of the framework. Clearly, any other kind of behavioural speciﬁcation
of an agent can be considered a policy. For example, a promising direction
could be considering logical frameworks (by exploiting model checking or proof
checkers).
The calculus we have presented is very basilar: it is even simpler than
CCS [13], as no synchronization can occur. Clearly, we did not aim at Turing-
completeness, but at a very basic framework in which to focus on the roˆle
of membranes. We conjecture that, by suitably advancing the theory pre-
sented here, all the ideas presented here can be lifted to more complex calculi
(including, e.g., synchronization, value passing and/or name restriction).
Related Work. In the last decade, several calculi for distributed systems
with code mobility have appeared in literature. In particular, structuring
a system as a (ﬂat or hierarchical) collection of named sites introduced the
possibility of dealing with sophisticated concrete features. For example, sites
can be considered as the unity of failure [6,1], mobility [6,3] or access control
[10,16,9]. The present work can be seen as a contribution to the last research
line.
Similarly to [9], we have presented a scenario where membranes can evolve.
However, the membranes presented in Section 4 only describe ‘what is left’ in
the site. On the other hand, the (dynamically evolving) type of a site in [9]
always constrains the overall behaviour of agents in the site and it is modiﬁed
upon acquisition/loss of privileges through computations.
We borrowed from [16] the notion of trust between sites. In loc. cit.,
agents coming from trusted sites are accepted without any control. Here, we
relaxed this choice by examining the digest of agents coming from trusted sites.
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Moreover, we have a ﬁxed net of trust; we believe that, once communication
is added to our basic, the richer scenario of [16] (where the partial knowledge
of a site can evolve during its computation) can be recovered.
A related paper is [12]. The authors develop a generic type system that
can be smoothly instantiated to enforce several properties of the π–calculus
(dealing with arity mismatch in communications, deadlock, race control and
linearity). They work with one kind of types, and modify the subtyping rela-
tion in order to yield several relevant notions of safety. The main diﬀerence
with our approach is that we have diﬀerent kind of types (and, thus, diﬀerent
type checking mechanisms) for any variation we propose. It would be nice to
lift our work to a more general framework closer to theirs; we leave this for
future work.
Our work is also related to [15]. Policies are described there as determinis-
tic ﬁnite automata and constrain the access to critical sections in a concurrent
functional language. A type and eﬀect system is provided that guarantees ad-
herence of systems to the policy. In particular, the sequential behaviour of
each thread is guaranteed to respect the policy, and the interleavings of the
threads’ locks to be safe. Diﬀerently from our paper, [15] has no code migra-
tion, and no explicit distribution; thus, only one centralised policy is used.
Membranes as ﬁlters between the computing body of a site and the external
environment are also considered in [5,2,17]. There, membranes are computa-
tionally capable objects, and can be considered as a kind of processes. They
can evolve and communicate both with the outer and with the inner part of
the associated node, in order to regulate the life of the node. This diﬀers from
our conception of membranes as simple tools for the veriﬁcation of incoming
agents.
To conclude, we remark that our understanding of membranes is radically
diﬀerent from the concept of policies in [4]. Indeed, in loc. cit., security au-
tomata control the execution of agents running in a site by in-lined monitoring.
This technique consists in accepting incoming code unconditionally, but block-
ing at runtime those actions not abiding the site policy. Clearly, in order to
implement the strategy, the execution of each action must be ﬁltered by the
policy. This contrasts with our approach, where membranes are ‘containers’
that regulate the interactions between sites and their environments. The com-
putation taking place within the site is out of the control of the membrane
that, hence, cannot rely on in-lined monitoring.
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